8 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Resume of OCB Luncheon Meeting, 8 June 1960

PRESENT: Mr. Allen, Mr. Dulles, Mr. Gray, Mr. Irwin,

Mr. McCone, Mr. Merchant, Mr. Riddleberger,

Mr. Scribner, Mr. Smith

1. Powers Case


The Board discussed a suggestion that the OCB Committee on Soviet and Related Problems should study the implications of the Powers case, with special attention to possible problems which might arise from his trial, in order that the appropriate agencies of government might be in a position to anticipate and deal with them.

	He suggested

to Mr. Merchant that, in view of the lack of response by the Soviets to the U.S. request to see Powers, it would be a good idea to make another request. He commented that it appears possible that Powers is undergoing some sort of brainwashing, which could account for the Soviet reluctance for U.S. officials to see him; therefore, it is necessary for the U.S. to build a record of attempts to do so. Failing this, we might start a rumor that the reason for the Soviet intransigence was the fact of this brainwashing.

There was some discussion of whether, and if so to what extent, the Soviet refusal violates the terms of the Litvinoff agreement.

Mr. Merchant said that the State Department was looking into this and other legal aspects on an urgent basis. It was agreed that the problem should be discussed further next week.



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2. Renewed Proposal from Congressman Porter

Mr. McCone distributed copies of correspondence to and from Congressman Porter, who has for the fourth time asked the AEC to permit display of models of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs at the Smithsonian Institution.

The Board reaffirmed to the AEC Chairman its previously-expressed view that from every viewpoint it would be a most unfortunate thing to display models, photographs or written descriptions of these weapons. Mr. McCone was urged to respond as firmly as possible to Congressman Porter along these lines. The suggestion was made that such a reply should not include topical references, such as the President's visit to Japan, so as not to encourage a similar request at a later date.

3. Transfer of Eniwetok Proving Ground

Mr. McCone reported that the AEC plans to transfer the control and management of the Eniwetok Proving Ground on 1 July 1960 to the Defense Department, to be incorporated into its Pacific Missile Range. He suggested the possibility of a brief news release on this subject.

There was some discussion as to the desirability or undesirability of issuing such a release. On balance, since the transfer would be known to large numbers of people and thus might occasion inquiry, the Board felt that Defense should issue a statement. Some opinions were expressed that it would be better not to issue the release unless there were public inquiries, but the consensus was that the timing should be left to Defense.

Mr. Dulles asked what effect the public knowledge of such a transfer might have on the U.S. position with respect to its Trust Territories; none of the members was particularly informed on the legal and other details of this aspect of the matter.

The Working Group was asked to coordinate a release to be made subject to Defense's discretion, as indicated above.

(Note: On 10 June the Acting Director of USIA declined to concur in the release of any statement until the return of the President to the U.S.)



4. President's Trip to Japan

There was considerable discussion of the President's impending trip to Japan. The DCI summarized the USIB discussion on Japan which had been held the previous day. Mr. McCone took a very serious view of the situation, feeling that the trip should probably be postponed. In rebuttal, Mr. Merchant presented most forcefully the view that to do this would be to give a triumph to the Communists and anti-American groups, which would have repercussions throughout Asia.

6 JUL 1960

ALLEN W. DULLES

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